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Professor Heather Gerken has made numerous important contributions to our un-
derstanding of democracy and federalism. It is entirely appropriate that the Tulsa Law
Review hold this symposium in her honor. Her work is especially notable for its ability to
reach across ideological barriers. The debate over federalism is often ideologically polar-
izing, with liberals, conservatives, and libertarians alike, often failing to present ideas
that have much interest for those who do not already share their views. Gerken is an unu-
sual example of a scholar whose work has broad cross-ideological appeal.
Part I of this article summarizes two key contributions that Professor Gerken has
made to federalism scholarship. The first is "taking federalism all the way down," the
idea that many of the benefits of federalism can be enhanced by empowering local gov-
ernments as well as states. 1 The second is her insistence that federalism can be used to
empower political dissenters, including racial and ethnic minorities.2 Subnational juris-
dictions where nationwide minorities are in the majority enable these minorities to exer-
cise power in their own right instead of relying on the good will of the national majority.
In Gerken's trademark phrase, they can "dissent by deciding." 3 This is a major challenge
to the conventional wisdom among American constitutional scholars, particularly
Gerken's fellow political liberals.
Part II proposes three extensions of Gerken's ideas, not all of which she would
necessarily agree with. First, both "federalism all the way down" and the empowerment
of minorities might be enhanced by greater attention to the benefits of "voting with your
feet" as well as voting at the ballot box. "Foot voting" has several important advantages
over ballot box voting as a tool for enhancing political freedom and expressing dissent.4
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful suggestions and comments, I
would like to thank Heather Gerken, David Schleicher, Ernest Young, and other participants in the Tulsa Law
Review's symposium in honor of Professor Heather Gerken.
1. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv. 4 (2010) [here-
inafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down].
2. Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37, 37-38 (2012), available at
http://www.democracyjoumal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=1 [hereinafter Gerken, A New
Progressive Federalism].
3. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Dis-
senting by Deciding]; Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1099, 1160 (2005).
4. Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 202,
210-11 (2011) [hereinafter Somin, Political Ignorance].
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It makes it easier for individuals and small groups to act on their preferences, and also
gives them stronger incentives to acquire and rationally evaluate information about the
available alternatives. 5 Gerken's analysis of federalism focuses almost entirely on the
potential benefits of ballot box voting at the local level while largely ignoring foot vot-
ing. Rectifying this omission would make her ideas even more powerful.
Second, for minorities to be able to "dissent by deciding" effectively, Gerken may
wish to rethink her opposition to judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on federal
power. If locally powerful minorities can, at any time, have their "dissent" overridden by
a majority-controlled central government, their ability to make decisions for themselves
might be severely constrained.
Finally, while Gerken argues that federalism may be beneficial for minority groups
today, she accepts the conventional wisdom that it was largely detrimental to them
throughout most early periods in American history. 6 In reality, however, the situation
was far more nuanced. Although state and local governments often oppressed minority
groups, so too did the federal government. At many points in American history, African
Americans and other minorities would have been even worse off with a unitary state than
they were under federalism. 7
In the conclusion, I briefly suggest some ways that future scholars can build on
Gerken's ideas.
I. HEATHER GERKEN'S FEDERALISM
Heather Gerken's challenge to the conventional wisdom on federalism rests on two
key pillars: "federalism all the way down" and "dissenting by deciding." Together, these
ideas combine to form an interesting and coherent vision.
A. Federalism All the Way Down
In her 2010 article "Federalism All the Way Down," Gerken argues that federalism
theory should focus on institutions below the level of state governments, including cities
and "special purpose" institutions, such as school boards, juries, specialized state agen-
cies, and others.8 Empowering these sub-state government bodies enables more of the
benefits of federalism to be realized, including greater policymaking diversity, and great-
er opportunity for various national minority groups to exercise majority power at the lo-
cal level.9 With a greater number and variety of institutions than that offered by the fifty
states, there is much more room for experimentation in policy and for many different
groups to get an opportunity to exercise decision-making authority.
Unlike most other defenders of federalism and decentralization, Gerken rejects the
idea that state or local governments should have "sovereign" authority that the federal
5. I develop these arguments in greater detail in Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Free-
dom, NoMos (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11-12), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2160388 [hereinafter
Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism], and Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 202.
6. See, e.g., Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2, at 39.
7. For a discussion of the relevant record, see Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5 (manuscript
at 24-29).
8. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 21-28.
9. Id. at 28-48.
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government is not permitted to override.10 She "join[s] the nationalists in insisting on the
center's ability to play the national supremacy card."1 1 This, she believes, undercuts tra-
ditional criticisms that federalism is dangerous to racial and ethnic minorities because it
allows local majorities to discriminate against them. Gerken argues that retention of the
"national supremacy card" does not deprive state and local governments of all meaning-
ful autonomy because they can still wield "the power of the servant."l2 Because states
and localities play an important role in implementing and extending federal policy, they
can also help shape its content. For example, state and federal governments depend on
local school boards to implement education policy, which thereby gives the latter consid-
erable leverage over what actually happens in the classroom. 13
"Federalism All the Way Down" is a valuable contribution to federalism literature.
It builds on previous literature that emphasizes the significance of sub-state government
bodies for federalism. 14 Gerken's distinctive contribution is to combine the focus on sub-
state government bodies with a rejection of dual sovereignty and an argument that feder-
alism all the way down can benefit minority groups, often to a greater extent than states
alone. Her point is reinforced by the dramatic contrast between the mere fifty state gov-
emments in the United States and the over 19,000 local and regional governments.15 It is
only rarely the case that a racial, religious or ethnic minority in the United States can
come to control a state government. The one clear case in American history is Utah,
which was established for the specific purpose of giving the long-persecuted Mormon
religious minority a state of their own.16 At the local level, however, it is much more
common for national minorities to be in the majority or at least exercise a strong influ-
ence, as demonstrated by the existence of numerous majority-black jurisdictions and are-
as where there is a large, politically influential gay and lesbian minority. 17
B. Dissenting by Deciding
Gerken's second major contribution to federalism theory is the notion of "dissent-
ing by deciding," the title of an important 2005 article she published in the Stanford Law
10. Id. at 45-46.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 35-41; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006).
13. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 38-39.
14. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959 (2007); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law
to Free Slate and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999); Richard C.
Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 147 (2005);
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 482 (2009).
15. As of 2007, the last year for which data was released, the Census Bureau estimated that there are 19,492
municipal governments in the United States, 3,033 county governments, and 16,519 townships. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 267 (2012).
16. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
17. Gerken herself has emphasized the importance of majority-minority jurisdictions for racial minorities.
See, e.g., Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2, at 38. On the advantages of localism for gays
and lesbians, see, for example, id. at 44, and Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Per-
spective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 719 (2003).
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Review. 18 The traditional mechanism by which liberals have sought to protect minority
rights and interests is through their inclusion in national political institutions and protec-
tion of rights by judicial review: what Gerken calls the "diversity paradigm."l9 By con-
trast, majority-minority jurisdictions enable dissenters to be more than "objects of consti-
tutional solicitude" for national institutions. "Minority rule," she emphasizes, "allows
racial minorities and dissenters to act as efficacious political actors, just as members of
the majority do. . . . It empowers racial minorities and dissenters not by shielding them
from the majority, but by turning them into one."21 In this way, they can dissent from
majority views not just by expressing contrary opinion, but by implementing their own
preferred views through state and local institutions. 22
This insight is not a surprise to students of federal systems outside the United
States. In many nations, federalism was adopted precisely for the purpose of giving lo-
cally dominant national minorities a jurisdiction of their own that they can control. 23
Consider such examples as French Canadians in Canada, the Basques in Spain, French
and Italian speakers in Switzerland, numerous minority groups in India, and the Kurds in
Iraq. In all of these cases, federal systems were established largely for the purpose of
creating an autonomous space for national minorities, and forestalling possible conflict
between them and the majority.
In the United States, such majority-minority jurisdictions have historically been
rare, with Mormon-dominated Utah being an unusual and generally ignored exception.
As a result, state and local governments are usually seen as the enemies of minority
groups rather than their friends. Gerken's contribution to the federalism debate in this
country is to suggest that American federalism may no longer be as anomalous as the
conventional wisdom supposes. So far, she has not relied on foreign examples to make
her case for what she has called a "New Progressive Federalism."24 Perhaps she will take
up this comparison in future work. But if she succeeds in persuading her fellow progres-
sives of the virtues of "dissenting by deciding," the American left's view of federalism
will move closer to that prevalent in most other nations with federal systems.
In Gerken's view, the potential benefits of "dissenting by deciding" extend beyond
the interests of locally dominant minorities themselves.25 By pursuing at the local or
state level policies at odds with those of national majorities, they can create an example
effect that might influence other jurisdictions to adopt the same approach, and even ulti-
mately affect federal policy. 26 The most prominent recent example is the rapid spread of
support for gay marriage since Massachusetts became the first state to adopt it in 2003.27
18. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3.
19. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2, at 42.
20. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 54.
21. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2, at 38.
22. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3, at 1754-63.
23. For a discussion of many such examples, see DAWN BRANCATI, PEACE BY DESIGN: MANAGING
INTRASTATE CONFLICT THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION 3 (2009); DIVERSITY AND UNITY IN FEDERAL
COUNTRIES: A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM 3, 4 (Luis Moreno & Cdsar Colino eds., 2010).
24. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2.
25. See Gerkin, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 10-11.
26. See id.
27. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
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There are now nine states that allow gay marriage, including three that adopted it by
popular referendum in the November 2012 election.2 8 CNN exit polls reveal a slight 49-
46 plurality in favor of gay marriage,29 a vast change from opinion just a few years earli-
er, when only thirty-one percent supported gay marriage in 2004 and sixty percent op-
posed it. 30 It is difficult to imagine such rapid change on the issue in the absence of local
and state dissent from the dominant national view.31
There is an important synergy between dissenting by deciding and federalism all
the way down. As already noted, empowering local and special purpose governments
along with states greatly increases the range of minorities who can take advantage of op-
portunities to dissent by deciding.32 In addition, increasing the number of governments
able to experiment with policies that deviate from majority preferences at the national
and state level also increases the range of policy experiments that could serve as exam-
ples that might later be adopted by other jurisdictions. 33
Gerken recognizes that the benefits of dissenting by deciding and federalism all the
way down do not always outweigh other considerations, some of which support greater
centralization.34 She merely seeks to "illuminate a set of arguments that are too often ex-
cluded from the equation." 35 Even so, they are important factors in the equation that
should not be neglected.
II. EXTENSIONS
Heather Gerken makes a compelling case for the virtues of taking federalism all
the way down and dissenting by deciding. But her position could be even stronger if
combined with three potential extensions of her argument. Both federalism all the way
down and dissenting by deciding would be more compelling if combined with an appre-
ciation of the virtues of foot voting and limits on federal power. Gerken's ideas could
also be reinforced by a reevaluation of the conventional wisdom on the relationship be-
tween federalism and racism in American history
A. Dissenting with Your Feet
People dissatisfied with status quo public policies where they live can resort to ei-
ther "exit" or "voice;" the former involves leaving the jurisdiction for one with more fa-
vorable laws, while the latter implies engagement in the local political process to try to
effect change.36 Decentralized federalism enables citizens to exercise exit by "voting
28. See Erik Eckholm, As Victories Pile Up, Gay Rights Advocates Cheer 'Milestone Year', N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/same-sex-marriage-gains-cheer-gay-rights-
advocates.html.
29. See President: Full Results, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:22 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president#exit-polls.
30. See More Support for Gun Rights, Gay Marriage than in 2008 or 2004, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.people-press.org/2012/04/25/more-support-for-gun-rights-gay-marriage-than-in-2008-or-2004.
31. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3, at 1763-64.
32. See discussion supra §I.A-B.
33. See generally Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 65-67.
34. See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
35. Id. at 11.
36. The distinction was first developed in ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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with their feet." 37 Instead of being stuck with the policies of the state and local govern-
ments they currently live under, they have the opportunity to move. 38
Somewhat surprisingly, Gerken does not integrate foot voting into her analysis in
either "Federalism All the Way Down" or "Dissenting by Deciding" She does consider a
different distinction between exit and voice, suggesting that the traditional account of
state sovereignty under which states are insulated from federal interference is an example
of "exit" because it involves leaving the control of the central government.39 In truth,
this kind of insulation of states from federal control is probably better interpreted as ena-
bling local majorities to exercise voice at a different level of government. 4 0 On the other
hand, Gerken does not consider the relevance of exit of a more obvious kind: voting with
your feet by moving from one jurisdiction to another.
This omission is unfortunate, because consideration of foot voting could strengthen
Gerken's case significantly. Throughout American history, foot voting through migration
has enabled a variety of persecuted minority groups to seek out more hospitable jurisdic-
tions. The best-known and most important example is the case of African American mi-
gration away from the Jim Crow-era South during the early twentieth century. 4 1 Between
1880 and 1920, some one million African Americans left the South for northern and
western states, a number amounting to some ten percent of the black population of the
United States in 1920.42 As a result, they greatly improved their situation, even though
their new homes were far from free of racism. 43
In more recent years, groups such as Hispanics and gays and lesbians have also
improved their situations by foot voting migration. The same goes for millions of people
who moved in search of superior job opportunities, better public services, or lower tax-
es.44
As a tool for dissenting by deciding, foot voting has some important advantages
over ballot box voting.45 First, it is easier for individuals or a small group to use. In order
to wield decisive influence at the ballot box, a group must be a majority, or at least large
enough to exercise significant electoral clout. By contrast, small groups and even indi-
viduals can readily make decisive choices by voting with their feet.
Second, foot voters have stronger incentives than ballot box voters to acquire rele-
vant information and use it rationally.4 6 Because of the very low probability of any indi-
vidual vote having a decisive impact on electoral outcomes, ballot box voters tend to be
37. Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 202-03.
38. For the classic account of foot voting, see Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
39. Gerken, Federalism all the Way Down, supra note 1, at 7.
40. Though it might facilitate exit indirectly. See Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 225-26.
41. For a discussion of this case and its relevance to foot voting and federalism, see id. at 215-21.
42. DANIEL JOHNSON & REX M. CAMPBELL, BLACK MIGRATION IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS 74-75, 77 (1981); Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 215-16.
43. Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 218.
44. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (Stanford Univ. Press, forthcoming, ch. 5
(on file with author)) (surveying some of the relevant evidence).
45. For a more detailed discussion of these advantages, see Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5.
The following discussion is in large part based on the more detailed analysis in that article.
46. See id; SOMIN, supra note 44 (manuscript (ch. 5)).
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"rationally ignorant."47 If one's only reason to acquire political knowledge is to be a
"better" voter, that turns out to not be much of an incentive at all.48 As a result, most
people tend to have very limited knowledge of politics, often being ignorant of even
basic facts, such as which party controls which branch of government, or which policies
have been adopted by incumbents.4 9 In addition, those voters who do choose to learn
substantial amounts of political knowledge often do so for reasons other than truth-
seeking; they act as "political fans," who enjoy "cheering on their preferred" party or
ideology.50 And like sports fans, they tend to overvalue any evidence that reflects well
on their favorite team, while downplaying or rejecting any evidence that cuts the other
way.51 Economist Bryan Caplan calls this "rational irrationality."52 When the goal of
acquiring knowledge is not to seek out the truth, but to enjoy being a "political fan" or
pursuing some other objective inimical to truth-seeking, it is actually rational behavior to
do a poor job of evaluating the information you learn. 53 Unbiased, logical evaluation of
information requires time and effort, and may interfere with one's enjoyment of the "po-
litical fan" experience. 54 As Caplan puts it, rationally ignorant voters limit not only the
amount of information they acquire but "how rationally they process the information
they do have." 55
By contrast, foot voters have much stronger incentives to both acquire information
and evaluate it rationally. When we decide what jurisdiction to live in, we know that the
choices we make have a "high probability" of being decisive. That greatly increases foot
voters' motivation to acquire information and to try to evaluate it in an unbiased way.
Foot voters still sometimes act irrationally and still fall short of being perfectly informed,
but they generally do much better on both counts than ballot box voters. 56
Foot voting is therefore often a more effective mechanism for "dissenting by de-
ciding" than the ballot box voting emphasized by Gerken. Her theory would become
stronger by incorporating it.
There is also a synergy between foot voting and Gerken's "federalism all the way
down." One of the main obstacles to effective foot voting is the problem of moving
costs. 57 Moving from one jurisdiction to another is costly, not just in terms of having to
47. The concept of rational ignorance was first introduced in ANTHONY DowNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 239-43 (1957). For my recent defense of the idea, see SOMIN, supra note 44 (manuscript).
48. SOMIN, supra note 44 (manuscript (Chapter 3: "The Rationality of Political Ignorance")).
49. For extensive surveys of the evidence, see, for example, ScoTT ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES
IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2003); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); RICHARD SHENKMAN, JUST How STUPID ARE WE? FACING
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER (2008); SOMIN, supra note 44 (manuscript at 1-18 (Chapter 1: "In-
troduction: Political Ignorance and the Exercise of Power Over Others")).
50. SOMIN, supra note 44 (manuscript at 21 (Chapter 3)).
5 1. See id.
52. BRYAN D. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER 122-24 (2007); Bryan Caplan, Rational Ig-
norance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3 (2001).
53. SOMIN, supra note 44 (Chapter 3: "The Rationality of Political Ignorance")).
54. Id.
55. Caplan, Rational Ignorance, supra note 52, at 5 (emphasis added).
56. I discuss these points much more fully in Somin, Political Ignorance, supra note 4, at 210-12; and
SOMIN, supra note 44 (Introduction).
57. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of moving costs and the reasons why it does not com-
pletely negate the case for foot voting see Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5 (manuscript at 16).
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pay for transportation, but because it often entails changing jobs or losing contact with
friends, relatives, and business associates. Devolving greater authority to lower-level ju-
risdictions reduces this problem. The costs of moving from one local jurisdiction to an-
other are often much lower than those of moving from one state to another.
Devolution of power "all the way down" also increases the range of choices avail-
able to foot voters. Instead of choosing between fifty states, they can choose between
thousands of smaller jurisdictions. Through foot voting, federalism all the way down can
facilitate a much wider array of options for those who wish to dissent by deciding.
Moving costs can be further reduced and options further increased by taking feder-
alism all the way down a step further than Gerken advocates in her article. As she briefly
notes, "[i]n theory, we could push federalism down to private associations, even to indi-
viduals."58 Gerken herself does not expand on this insight. But the implications for foot
voting are significant. Allowing individuals and private associations to decide more is-
sues for themselves is likely to reduce moving costs and increase choices even beyond
those offered by local governments. 5 9 There is room for a much larger number of private
sector organizations than governments in any given area, thereby reducing the moving
costs of switching from one to another. Over fifty million Americans already live in pri-
vate planned communities, such as condominium associations.60 Devolving more author-
ity to these and other private organizations could greatly facilitate the effectiveness of
foot voting.
None of the above proves either that we should strive to maximize decentralization
in government or maximize the transfer of power from government to the private sector.
There is a wide range of arguments for centralization and government intervention that
are unrelated to foot voting, "dissenting by deciding," or "federalism all the way down."
Like Gerken herself, I am not attempting to make a comprehensive cost-benefit evalua-
tion of federalism or the free market. In any given situation, the case for centralization or
the case for intervention might outweigh the benefits of promoting foot voting. Here, I
advance only the more limited claim that foot voting can increase the advantages of fed-
eralism all the way down and dissenting by deciding emphasized by Gerken.
B. Rethinking the History ofFederalism and Racism
The most influential critique of federalism in the United States damns it for its his-
toric association with racism. Longstanding conventional wisdom holds that federalism
was a disaster for minority groups, while the growth of federal power greatly benefitted
them. 62 As the leading political scientist William Riker put it in 1964, "[t]he main bene-
ficiary [of federalism] throughout American history has been the Southern Whites, who
58. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 22 n.59.
59. I advance this argument in greater detail in Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5. See also Ilya
Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 71 (symposium on Governance and Pow-
er).
60. ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
xiii (2005).
61. See, e.g., Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 10-11.
62. For a good recent summary of this conventional wisdom, see Douglas Laycock, Protecting Liberty in a
Federal System: The US Experience, in PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK
119, 121-45 (Jorg Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis, eds. 2006).
530 Vol. 48:523
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/8
TAKING DISSENTING BY DECIDING ALL THE WAY DOWN
have been given the freedom to oppress Negroes .. . . [I]f in the United States one ap-
proves of Southern white racists, then one should approve of American federalism." 6 3
Heather Gerken contends that the received wisdom no longer holds true under modern
conditions.64 But she largely accepts its analysis of the past.65
There is much truth to the conventional wisdom on federalism and race. It is indis-
putable that state governments engaged in massive oppression of racial minorities, par-
ticularly in the eras of slavery and Jim Crow segregation. It is also true that federal inter-
vention was decisive in putting an end to slavery in the 1860s and state-enforced
segregation a century later.
But the overall history of federalism and racism is much more complex than the
conventional wisdom suggests. If state governments often oppressed minorities, the same
can be said for the federal government, which throughout much of its history promoted
slavery and segregation rather than racial equality.66 During the antebellum period, the
federal government was often controlled by pro-slavery interests who enacted legislation
such as the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850.67 After federal efforts to promote
equality for African Americans largely ended in the late 1870s, the federal government
often promoted segregation in those areas it completely controlled, including the District
of Columbia, the U.S. military, and the federal civil service.68 The federal government
also played a major role in oppressing other racial and religious minorities, including
driving Native Americans off their land, persecuting the Mormons, and imprisoning Jap-
anese Americans in concentration camps during World War 11.69
During many periods in American history, African Americans and other racial mi-
norities might well have suffered more under a unitary state than under federalism. 70 A
unitary policy on race at the time of the founding would likely have resulted in nation-
wide slavery, preventing northern states from abolishing the institution as most did in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A unitary policy on racial segregation dur-
ing the Jim Crow era might well have led to nationwide policies closer to those of the
South than those that prevailed in the North, as was in fact the case in the federally con-
trolled District of Columbia. 7 1
Most important of all, a unitary policy on racial issues would have denied blacks
and other minorities the opportunity to vote with their feet for relatively less oppressive
jurisdictions, as millions ultimately did. This would have harmed not only the migrants
themselves, but even blacks who remained in the South, who were ultimately freed in
part because of the political influence of blacks who moved to the North, where African
63. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 152, 155 (1964).
64. See, e.g., Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2.
65. See id. at 37 (noting that history gives progressives "good reason" to be "skeptical of federalism").
66. 1 discuss the federal record in more detail in Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5 (manuscript
at 24-27).
67. Id. (manuscript at 25).
68. For a discussion of the federal role in promoting segregation during this era, see DESMOND KING,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (rev. ed. 2007).
69. For a brief review of these cases, see Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5 (manuscript at 26).
70. For a more detailed discussion of the examples mentioned in this paragraph, including relevant cita-
tions, see id. (manuscript at 23-29).
71. See id at 24.
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Americans were allowed to vote.72 Under a unitary nationwide policy on race, it is far
from clear whether northern African Americans would have been given the right to vote
as early as they were.73
In a nation where majority opinion was as racist as it was in the United States
throughout much of its history, racial minorities were likely to face extensive discrimina-
tion regardless of whether the political system was unitary or federalist. But, in many
cases, federalism made the situation marginally better rather than the worse.
It would be a mistake to completely reverse the conventional wisdom and claim
that federalism was uniformly a "boon" to racial minorities. Its actual effect varied over
time. But recognizing this variation would be an important step forward from the con-
ventional assumption that federalism was overwhelmingly a boon for racists and a trage-
dy for their victims.
A more nuanced and accurate understanding of the relationship between federalism
and racism in American history is valuable in itself. It is a natural extension of Heather
Gerken's reevaluation of federalism's relationship to minority interests today. And if we
come to understand that federalism was not always a racist devil in the past and centrali-
zation not always on the side of the angels, we might be more open to Gerken's case for
federalism as a tool that enables minorities to dissent by deciding.
C. Rethinking the Need for Limits on Federal Power
Despite her emphasis on several key benefits of federalism, Gerken remains op-
posed to enforcement of structural limits on the scope of federal power. She "insist[s] on
the center's ability to play the national supremacy card." 74 But, as she herself recognizes,
there is a serious tension between this position and her defense of federalism as a tool
that enables minorities to dissent by deciding. As she puts it, "[o]ne might object that the
power to decide is meaningless for dissenters as long as the centralized authority can
overrule it."75
It would seem that if Gerken is committed to the idea that dissenting by deciding is
an important advantage of federalism, she should support at least some significant limits
on federal power, including judicial enforcement thereof. At the very least, she should
consider endorsing relatively modest constraints on federal authority like those enforced
by the Supreme Court in decisions such as United States v. Morrison,76 United States v.
Lopez,7 7 and, most recently, NFIB v. Sebelius.78 Even if expanded significantly, these
decisions would pose little, if any, threat to Congress' authority to ban racial, ethnic, and
religious discrimination. They do, however, give local and state governments a sphere of
72. Id. (manuscript at 26-27).
73. For more detailed discussion of the points developed in this paragraph, see id. at 24-30.
74. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 10.
75. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3, at 1763.
76. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
77. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
78. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Although the Court narrowly upheld
Obama's health care plan's individual health insurance mandate in this case, it did emphasize that the law was
outside the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. It also struck
down a provision of the act requiring states to greatly expand their Medicaid programs or give up all federal
subsidization of their Medicaid programs. See id. at 2587-608.
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autonomy within which minorities could dissent by deciding without fear of being over-
ridden by the federal government.
Gerken's response to this potential critique is that state and local governments that
dissent by deciding have some ability to protect their decision even if the central gov-
ernment retains its trump card. By pursuing their own policy preferences, they can begin
a political dialogue that might ultimately influence opinion elsewhere, including perhaps
at the federal level. 79
It is certainly true that the "demonstration effect" created by local experiments may
sometimes sway opinion. As noted above, this seems to have happened in the case of gay
marriage.80 But this answer undercuts one of the main advantages of dissenting by decid-
ing over conventional political dissent in Gerken's theory. As she puts it, federalism
"gives racial minorities the chance to shed the role of influencer or gadfly and stand in
the shoes of the majority" by making policy in their own jurisdictions. 8 But so long as
the national majority retains the power to override the minorities' decisions at will, the
latter are again relegated to the role of "influencer or gadfly."82 They can retain their au-
tonomy only so long as they can persuade the national majority to let them have their
way. To be sure, as Gerken notes, they now benefit from the force of inertia and endow-
ment effects, which may make it harder for the central government to override their deci-
sions. 83 But that force is unlikely to prevent the national majority from overriding a state
or local decision that the former believes is seriously antithetical to its values or policy
objectives. In this way, minorities can dissent by deciding only so long as they do not
deviate too greatly from the preferences of the national majority.
Moreover, it is not clear that state and local governments will actually use their
overridable authority to try to persuade the national majority to let them have their own
distinct policies. In many cases, state governments have strong incentives to go along
with adverse federal decisions, especially if doing so results in higher federal subsidies. 84
This point does not definitively prove that judicial enforcement of limits on federal
power is desirable. Many other considerations would have to be weighed before reaching
such a conclusion.85 And even if the basic idea of judicial enforcement is accepted, there
is still the difficult question of determining how tight enforcement should be.
Here, I do not attempt to resolve these broader questions. Rather, my point is the
more limited one that enforcement of limits on federal power may be a better fit for
Gerken's theories than her own embrace of a federal trump card. Dissenting by deciding
is more likely to be viable if the dissenters actually have the power to make decisions
that are final.
79. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3, at 1763-66.
80. See discussion supra §t.B.
81. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 2, at 42.
82. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 1, at 56.
83. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 3, at 1763-64.
84. For a discussion of the ways in which state government interests conflict with the goal of maintaining
policy diversity in a federal system, see John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States'Rights: A De-
fense ofJudicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89 (2004).
85. For a broader defense of such enforcement, see id at 90.
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CONCLUSION
Heather Gerken's theories of federalism all the way down and dissenting by decid-
ing are valuable contributions to the debate over federalism and democracy. Scholars of
differing ideological persuasions can build on them, as I have tried to do in some of my
own work, despite fundamental political disagreements between us.86 Gerken's ideas
might be even more compelling if combined with a greater emphasis on foot voting, a
reconsideration of the conventional wisdom on the history of federalism and race, and an
appreciation for the synergy between dissenting by deciding and enforcement of consti-
tutional limits on federal power.
Gerken's theories also raise some questions that federalism scholars and students
of democratic theory should try to pursue in the future. Her emphasis on the benefits of
dissenting by deciding in the United States can be usefully integrated with an analysis of
the experience of federal systems elsewhere, where something like this idea has long
been the main rationale for establishing federalism in multiethnic societies. Similarly, her
idea of federalism all the way down can be extended to include private organizations as
well as governmental ones.87
Other scholars with backgrounds and research interests different from mine will no
doubt have their own potential extensions of Gerken's theories. Since Gerken's major
articles are all only a few years old, we cannot yet fully assess their ultimate impact.
What we can say is that she has already done much to enhance understanding of what the
Supreme Court calls "Our Federalism." 89
86. See, e.g., Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2).
87. See id. (manuscript at 29).
88. For example, in his contribution to this symposium, my colleague David Schleicher argues that
Gerken's theories can be used as a guide for improving the design of electoral districts. See Schleicher, From
Here All-the-Way-Down, Or How To Write a Festschrift Piece, 48 TULSA L. REv. 401, 403 (2013).
89. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (noting widespread use of this phrase).
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